This book investigates the creation of the first truly nationalized party organizations in the United States in the late nineteenth century, an innovation that reversed the parties' traditional privileging of state and local interests in presidential nominations and the conduct of national campaigns. Between 1880 and 1896, party elites crafted a defense of these national organizations that charted the theoretical parameters of American party development into the twentieth century. With empowered national committees and a new understanding of the parties' role in the political system, national party leaders dominated American politics in new ways, renewed the parties' legitimacy in an increasingly pluralistic and nationalized political environment, and thus maintained their relevance throughout the twentieth century. The new organizations particularly served the interests of presidents and presidential candidates, and the presidencies of the late nineteenth century demonstrate the first stirrings of modern presidential party leadership.
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Preface
This study began as a search for remedies for the familiar disease of party decline. It made sense to look for such remedies in the late nineteenth century, the period of American parties' supposed peak performance. Perhaps, I supposed, by better understanding the parties' defense of methods that have since come to be mistrusted, today's parties could be strengthened. This original purpose quickly collapsed. As I pursued the public and private writings of party leaders of the time, I was struck by just how willing they were to jettison much of what political scientists believe made the parties strong, and just how willing they were to adopt practices that presaged twentieth-century party politics. Instead of a ringing defense of traditional methods -along the lines of George Washington Plunkitt's famous series of very plain talks on very practical politics -I found a raging debate over the need to renew party organizations in America. This is odd. Why would party leaders be experiencing a crisis of confidence in parties at precisely the time that many political scientists believe parties to have been operating at optimal productivity? This book is an account of their collective wondering, their struggle to preserve institutions that held great emotional and practical value to them, while adjusting them to a new political environment. It is a story of changing ideas and changing institutions, but it is also a story of what it is that allows institutions as loosely constructed as parties to perpetuate themselves. In an age in which partisan politics was viewed as suspiciously as any (except perhaps in the Founding era or our own), these elites struggled to force the parties to adapt without abandoning their commitment to the two-party system. Despite the frequent charge that the parties have done little but weaken since the dawn of the twentieth century, their work made the two-party system stronger. It effectively silenced a generation of third-party challenges, made peace with a flurry of extra-partisan citizen associations, updated parochial and dysfunctional party methods to meet the emergent demands of a newly nationalized political environment, and fashioned a new style of campaigning that was particularly well suited to this new mode of organizing. This is a reminder that Throughout the late 1800s, the parties were challenged by a variety of entities (third parties, national interest associations, reform organizations) that suggested the parties had lost their relevance to the conditions faced by most voters. These entities did not succeed in displacing the Republican and Democratic parties from their preeminent place in American public life; but by exploiting some of the parties' weaknesses (and the period's tight electoral competition), they did arouse national party leaders to new openings for popular leadership. For all the zeal of the late-nineteenth-century reform movement, party leaders were not forced to accept reform; they were persuaded that the newly nationalized political environment provided opportunities as well as threats. Thus, the two-party system survived -and emerged stronger from -the late nineteenth century because it served the purpose it was established to serve: helping ambitious politicians obtain power.
In particular, national party leaders became aware of the potential for expanding the parties' national campaign operations to craft a truly national party-in-the-electorate. The parties had originally been organized to resist just this kind of nationalization. Although party competition as an abstract concept had become widely accepted by the mid-nineteenth century, it was party competition of a particular sort -distinctively republican in structure and style, presuming the proper and safest form of political organizing to be grounded in local communities. A national party organization that reached a national party-in-the-electorate could not simply be asserted; a national party politics had to be defined and defended.
Others are left to decide whether or not this is a positive development (the thrust of much of the decline of party literature). This work is limited to two chief contentions. First, the nineteenth-century opposition to party did not have the effect of neutering the parties but provided a new intellectual heritage for the parties that shaped them during the twentieth century. Second, this new idea of party triggered constitutional potentials that had lain dormant under the republican revolution of the Jacksonian organizational mode. Without revising the Constitution, the Jacksonian party system grafted republican political practices onto the American regime that diminished its liberal elements; especially its fostering of a national community of conflicting interests (as articulated by James Madison in The Federalist), and its endorsement of positive presidential leadership (as articulated by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist). To prevent the salience of national communities of interest, the Jacksonian mode rigorously enforced geographic communities as the sole means of entry into the national party organization and subordinated the presidency to a nominating system dominated by state and local party organizations. The late-nineteenth-century idea of party, however, envisioned a party-in-the-electorate that transcended geographic boundaries (some of which, it should be noted, were also supplied www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press
Preface ix by the Constitution), a special role for national interest associations in party politics, and a presidency that could mobilize mass publics independently of local partisan communities.
This transformation in the fundamental idea of party did not effectively remake the party organizations by 1896 -the end point of this study. Not until the solidification of the presidential direct primary in the 1970s did the new idea of party achieve something like full institutionalization. In the meantime, the new idea underwrote the emergence of the direct primary in the early 1900s, an emergent style of national presidential leadership, and an increasingly confident public interest association sector, even as the first half of the twentieth century saw the reassertion of state and local organizational power. Although most previous studies of these twentieth-century developments have emphasized the creation of institutions and laws that have formalized these changes, this study makes the case for the formative role of party leaders' ideas of how political conflict should be ordered. Those ideas coalesced into broad agreement among a critical cadre of national elites between 1880 and 1896; and this consensus formed the parameters of the ways their successors -in politics, the media, and the social sciences -evaluated the parties. Concurring with Richard Hofstadter, I do not describe this as anything as systemic as a "theory," nor as pleasing as an "ideal" of party. It was a political thing, crafted by practical politicians (who, like Plunkitt, were more concerned with what worked than with reconciling their practice to democratic theory). It was used to promote individual politicians' competencies and to legitimate party politics to the public. The idea was shaped by a variety of insights into the ways in which political life changed in the late nineteenth century and the ways in which parties would continue to order political affairs despite these changes. It was not written in any textbook; but it became part of the language politicians used to communicate with one another -sometimes openly, sometimes in a kind of insider shorthand. It told politicians how to behave, how to win votes, and where to concentrate resources. In short, it envisioned a distinct mode of party operations. If this idea did not achieve immediate organizational transformation from within the parties, it provides a powerful explanation of the source of the long process of party transformation in the twentieth century.
www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-19281-1 -The Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880-1896 Daniel Klinghard Frontmatter More information I owe more debts in the writing of this book than I can satisfactorily discharge. They began to accrue in the office of my dissertation advisor, Sidney M. Milkis, who demonstrated to me the value of a historical approach to political science, convinced me of the causes for concern about the state of American political parties, and urged me to take the late-nineteenth-century parties seriously; his influence on my thinking, style, and inclinations is apparent throughout. I was fortunate that Morton Keller, whom I have come to know as a superb advisor as well as a superb historian, agreed to serve on my committee; and even more fortunate that he generously agreed to give more time to guiding me than I thought I deserved (especially after he read a draft of my proposal, which provoked his first piece of advice to me: "If you're going to study the nineteenth century, you have to learn how to spell 'tariff' and 'gilded.'"). Marc Landy's careful reading and thoughtful comments continue to influence the way I think about the period. Steve Teles, my bighearted counselor in all things academic, the long-suffering reader of my lengthening prose, and as faithful a dissertation reader as ever there was, deserves special credit for making this possible.
I could not have completed the archival research for this book without the financial support I received from a number of sources. Brandeis University funded my earliest trips to the Library of Congress. A "We the People" grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities enabled me to spend a valuable year at the Library of Congress and at the Pennsylvania Historical Society. The College of the Holy Cross generously granted me leave that year, as well as funding for another archival trip. At those archives, as well as at the Massachusetts Historical Society and the American Antiquarian Society, I had the benefit of the assistance of archivists and staff who not only fulfilled my requests for materials, but alerted me to new materials of interest; in going above the call of duty, they have helped me fill in a number of gaps in my research. Sharon Matys of Holy Cross provided much-needed assistance with the graphics in Chapters 1 and 6. Since the dissertation stage, I have pressed this work on more colleagues than I can recall. I first began thinking about party development when working on an undergraduate thesis advised by Mike Nelson (I never print a page without thinking of his editorship or his approach to the presidency), along with Daniel Cullen and Stephen Wirls. Dennis Hale first alerted me that there might be something interesting to say about Grover Cleveland. David Mayhew and David Art kindly read drafts that were much longer than what appears here. My colleagues at Holy Cross, B. Jeffrey Reno, Dustin Gish, and Loren Cass, have all provided helpful advice, thoughts, and ideas; Donald Brand has been an especially inspiring mentor, an exemplar of what academic life should be. Brian Cook not only led me to some helpful thoughts on Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson but was a cheerleader in times of stress. At various conference panels along the way, I received helpful comments from John Berg, Daniel Carpenter, Joseph Cooper, Graham Dodds, Brian Glenn, Timothy Nokken, Howard Reiter, and John Reynolds; in many ways that I hope they recognize, I have integrated their suggestions into my argument. I have also been blessed to have had good friends who have tolerated a lot of talk about the minutiae of nineteenth-century politics, including Jeremy Bailey, Andrew Bove, Nicole Hales, Daniel Kenney, Mark Miller, and Andrew Veprek. At Cambridge University Press, Lewis Bateman nurtured the manuscript from a very early stage, and Emily Spangler graciously walked me through the details of publication. My two anonymous reviewers were a model of constructive scholarly criticism -they engaged me honestly and genuinely, and this is a better book because of them.
My mother, my father, my brother David, and my sister Mary Elizabeth gave me moral support from the beginning; and I am forever grateful for that. My grandmother, Martha Sue Mills, gave me an appreciation of the importance of history that continues to influence my work. This book is dedicated to my wife Cheri, because she gave me more to love in life than my work. Her encouragement makes the completion of this book a sweeter accomplishment than it could ever have been alone; as does the prospect of repaying my patient children, Amsden and Jocelyn Mae, for all of the time I spent with it rather than with them.
